

# AIRBUS

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## A320 FAMILY

**Main FCOM / QRH / FCTM Changes  
May 2024**

## Main FCOM / QRH / FCTM Changes Included since May 2024

The main FCOM / QRH / FCTM changes described in this document will be available in the Operator FCOM / QRH / FCTM manuals, based on the Operator's revision cycle.

1. SOP/SUP - Update of the GPS Interference Procedure.....	3
2. SOP - Update of the Procedure for the Thrust Bump Function.....	3
3. SUP - Touch and Go - Revised Technique.....	4
4. SUP - Removal of the FCOM TDU "One Engine Taxi - MMEL Consideration".....	4
5. New TAB - Inadvertent Takeoff Data Reversion upon RWY Change.....	5
6. New TAB - Erroneous FMS Predictions due to ACT F-PLN Corruption by SEC F-PLN.	
7. New TAB - Loss of RMP Data Synchronization that Results in the Loss of One RMP	6
8. New TAB - Noises that May Result in the Loss of Audio Communications.....	6
9. Enhancement of the Fuel Overread Procedure.....	6
10. New Dispatch Consideration for ETOPS Flight Preparation - Specific Check of the F/PLN (CAS > 260 kt).....	7
11. Enhancement of the VAPP Determination for Landing Performance Assessment...	8
12. Update of the Note in the Procedure for CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT Procedure.....	8
13. Introduction of the ROPS Runway Length instead of LDA.....	9
14. Addition of information in the Engine Ice Shedding Procedure.....	9
15. Non-Authorized Reset in the case of Multiple ECAM Alerts.....	10
16. Precautions for Cockpit Seat Mechanical Adjustment.....	10

## 1. SOP/SUP - Update of the GPS Interference Procedure

### 1.1. Effects on the Manual

- FCOM
  - Update of the *Aircraft Systems / Surveillance / GPWS / Controls and Indicators / Overhead Panel*.
  - Update of the *Procedures / Normal Procedures / Supplementary Procedures / GPS Interferences*.

### 1.2. Summary of the Modifications

The purpose of the modification is to update the list of effects that may be encountered during GNSS interference, and to adjust the associated procedure to the updated guidance.

The description section of the procedure also includes a link to the impact of the inhibition of the Predictive Terrain mode.

## 2. SOP - Update of the Procedure for the Thrust Bump Function

### 2.1. Effect on the Manuals

- FCOM
  - Update of the *Procedures / Normal Procedures / Standard Operating Procedures / Takeoff*.
- QRH
  - Update of the *Normal Checklist / Line-up*.
- FCTM
  - Update of the *Procedures / Normal Procedures / Normal Checklists / Line-Up*.

### 2.2. Applicability

Applicable to A320 Family aircraft equipped with the Thrust Bump function.

### 2.3. Summary of the Modifications

The manuals are updated in order to ensure that the Thrust Bump function is engaged during takeoff, when the flight crew plans a takeoff with Thrust Bump.

The SOPs and the checklists are updated to add the check of the Thrust Bump arming and engagement, if the Thrust Bump is used.

### 3. SUP - Touch and Go - Revised Technique

#### 3.1. Effect on the Manual

- FCTM
  - Update of the *Procedures / Normal Procedures / Supplementary Procedures / Touch and Go*.

#### 3.2. Summary of the Modifications

To ensure a standard technique with the A330/A350/A380 families, the Touch and Go section of the FCTM is updated as follows:

##### Before Touch and Go:

In order to better manage the energy of the aircraft after liftoff, the flight crew can decrease the value of the thrust reduction altitude in the FMS PERF GA page. The minimum value is the runway elevation plus 400 ft.

##### After Touch and Go:

Reduce thrust from TOGA to CL detent, only when the LVR CLB flashes on the FMA.

The revised technique has the following advantages:

- It clarifies when the flight crew can reduce thrust after a Touch and Go (LVR CLB flashes on the FMA).
- It standardizes the thrust reduction technique, in accordance with the Standard Operating Procedures for takeoff and Go-Around (GA)
- It provides guidelines for energy management (i.e. decrease of the thrust reduction altitude in the FMS PERF GA page).

### 4. SUP - Removal of the FCOM TDU “One Engine Taxi - MMEL Consideration”

#### 4.1. Effect on the Manuals

- FCOM
  - Update of the *Procedures / Normal Procedures / Supplementary Procedures / Engines / One Engine Taxi - General*
  - Cancellation of the *Procedures / Normal Procedures / Supplementary Procedures / Engines / TDU One Engine Taxi - MMEL Consideration*.
- FCTM
  - Update of the *Procedures / Normal Procedures / Supplementary Procedures / Engines / One Engine Taxi - General*.

#### 4.2. Summary of the Modifications

The FCOM TDU that provides the list of MMEL items where “One Engine Taxi operations are not permitted” is canceled. The MMEL operational procedures directly provide the additional information/limitations associated with One Engine Taxi operations, when applicable.

## 5. New TAB - Inadvertent Takeoff Data Reversion upon RWY Change

### 5.1. Effect on the Manual

- FCOM
  - Introduction of the *Aircraft Systems / Auto Flight - Flight Management / Temporary Abnormal Behaviors / Inadvertent Takeoff Speeds Reversion upon RWY Change*.

### 5.2. Applicability

Applicable to aircraft equipped with the FMS2 Honeywell.

### 5.3. Summary of the Modifications

A new TAB is created to provide the operational recommendation to prevent an FMS takeoff speed and a takeoff thrust reversion, in the case of runway change.

## 6. New TAB - Erroneous FMS Predictions due to ACT F-PLN Corruption by SEC F-PLN

### 6.1. Effect on the Manual

- FCOM
  - Introduction of the *Aircraft Systems / Auto Flight - Flight Management / Temporary Abnormal Behaviors / FMS2 HONEYWELL Temporary Abnormal Behaviors / Erroneous FMS Predictions due to ACT F-PLN Corruption by SEC F-PLN*.

### 6.2. Applicability

Applicable to aircraft equipped with the FMS Honeywell R2 (from H3).

### 6.3. Summary of the Modifications

A new TAB is created to provide the operational recommendation if the crew detects the effects of an active F-PLN corrupted by the SEC F-PLN (i.e. divergent ETA and predictions on one side).

In this case, the deletion of the corrupted SEC F-PLN and a recomputation of the active F-PLN are recommended as a corrective mitigation.

## 7. New TAB - Loss of RMP Data Synchronization that Results in the Loss of One RMP

### 7.1. Effect on the Manual

- FCOM
  - Introduction of the *Aircraft Systems / Communications / Temporary Abnormal Behaviors / Loss of RMP Data Synchronization that Results in the Loss of One RMP*.

### 7.2. Applicability

Applicable to aircraft equipped with digital RMP.

### 7.3. Summary of the Modifications

A new TAB is created to provide the operational recommendation, in the case of a loss of data synchronization between RMP(s) (e.g. loss of frequency synchronization).

## 8. New TAB - Noises that May Result in the Loss of Audio Communications

### 8.1. Effect on the Manual

- FCOM
  - Introduction of the *Aircraft Systems / Communications / Temporary Abnormal Behaviors / Noises that May Result in the Loss of Audio Communications*.

### 8.2. Applicability

Applicable to aircraft equipped with digital RMP.

### 8.3. Summary of the Modifications

A new TAB is created to provide the operational recommendation, in the case of specific noises identified through the loudspeakers or boomsets. The noise may increase until all communications are no longer audible.

## 9. Enhancement of the Fuel Overread Procedure

### 9.1. Effect on the Manuals

- FCOM
  - Update of the *Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / FUEL / [QRH] FUEL OVERREAD*.
- QRH
  - Update of the *Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / FUEL / FUEL OVERREAD*.
- FCTM
  - Update of the *Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / FUEL / Fuel Overread*.

## 9.2. Summary of the Modifications

The purpose of the update is to add an action to recover the FMS fuel predictions, in the case of a fuel over read situation.

The flight crew should calculate the current FOB from the FOB at departure minus the fuel used, and insert this calculated FOB in the FUEL PRED page of the FMS. The FMS fuel predictions are then computed based on the inserted FOB and the fuel flow sensors only. Fuel quantity sensors, that provide erroneous information, are no longer used for the FMS fuel predictions.

## 10. New Dispatch Consideration for ETOPS Flight Preparation - Specific Check of the F/PLN (CAS > 260 kt)

### 10.1. Effect on the Manual

- FCOM
  - Introduction of the *FCOM / Procedures / Special Operations / Extended Range Operations / Dispatch Consideration / Check of CAS for L/G Safety Valve closure.*

### 10.2. Applicability

Applicable to all A320 Family aircraft, except aircraft equipped with the Air Data / Inertial Reference System - L5 Software (MOD 173666, MP P22471).

### 10.3. Summary of the Modifications

As per the FCOM description of the landing gears and doors operation:

- The purpose of the safety valve of the L/G is to cut off the hydraulic supply of the L/G system, in order to avoid the accidental extension of the L/G during the flight.
- As per design, the safety valve is closed when the CAS is above 260 kt.

If the in-flight CAS never exceeds 260 kt, the safety valve remains open, and a single failure on the L/G may cause an accidental L/G extension (i.e. failure of the selector valve that controls the L/G extension). In this case, an accidental L/G extension during the flight causes an over consumption of fuel that may affect the diversion capability in ETOPS flights.

Following the EASA recommendations, and in order to mitigate this scenario, Airbus modified the ETOPS Dispatch Considerations to ask the operators to check the F-PLN before flight, to confirm that the CAS will exceed 260 kt before the aircraft reaches the top of climb. This condition is necessary for the closure of the L/G safety valve.

## 11. Enhancement of the VAPP Determination for Landing Performance Assessment

### 11.1. Effect on the Manual

- FCOM
  - Update of the *Aircraft Systems / Auto Flight - General / Speeds Definition / Other Speeds*
  - Update of the *Performance (EFB) / Landing / In-Flight Performance Assessment / Landing Performance without In-Flight Failure*
  - Update of the *Performance (EFB) / Landing / In-Flight Performance Assessment / Landing Performance following In-Flight Failure*.

### 11.2. Summary of the Modifications

The description of the way to determine the VAPP (Final Approach Speed) is enhanced, in order to:

- Provide more information on the VAPP formula
- Enhance the system description
- Provide operational recommendations.

The definition of the VAPP and its associated operational recommendations are now described in the chapter *Landing Performance without In-Flight Failure*.

In addition, the chapter *Landing Performance Following an In-Flight Failure* now also includes the following:

- A clarification on the situations that, following an in-flight failure, affect the landing distance
- The operational recommendations in the case of high approach speed.

## 12. Update of the Note in the Procedure for CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT Procedure

### 12.1. Effect on the Manual

- FCOM
  - Update of the *Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / CAB PR / CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT*.

### 12.2. Summary of the Modifications

The note related to the EMER DESCENT in the procedure for CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT is updated.

This note now contains V/S and cabin altitude targets. The flight crew should adjust the V/S CTL switch in accordance with these targets, if the outflow valves do not close when descent is established.



## 13. Introduction of the ROPS Runway Length instead of LDA

### 13.1. Effect on the Manuals

- FCOM
  - Update of the *Aircraft Systems / Surveillance / ROW/ROP / Description*
  - Update of the *Limitations / ROW/ROP*.
- FCTM
  - Update of the *Aircraft Systems / ROW/ROP*.

### 13.2. Applicability

Applicable to all A320 Family aircraft equipped with ROPS Step 2 or Step 2+.

### 13.3. Summary of the Modifications

The term “Landing Distance Available (LDA)” is changed to “ROPS runway length”. The definition of the ROPS runway length is available in the FCOM for the ROPS Step 2 and ROPS Step 2+ configurations.

In a nominal case:

- For aircraft equipped with T3CAS, the ROPS runway length is the LDA.
- For aircraft equipped with EGPWS, the ROPS runway length is the runway length from the Jeppesen source data.

However, on an individual basis, the ROPS runway length can deviate from the nominal case (e.g. to avoid nuisance alerts when the A/C approaches the runway end, and part of the physical runway length is not considered within the LDA/Jeppesen runway length).

## 14. Addition of information in the Engine Ice Shedding Procedure

### 14.1. Effect on the Manual

- FCOM
  - Update of the *Procedures / Normal Procedures / Supplementary Procedures / Adverse Weather / Engine Operations on Ground in Icing Conditions*.

### 14.2. Summary of the Modifications

To enable operators to optimize aircraft operations:

- For all engine types of the A320 Family, new information is added to provide the possible areas and conditions to perform the ice shedding procedure before line-up.
- For the applicable engine types (V2500 A1&A5, PW6100, CFM56-5A&5B), new information is added to indicate that the final engine acceleration can be performed in combination with the takeoff procedure.

For additional information on this subject, refer to the ISI article 00.00.00460.

## 15. Non-Authorized Reset in the case of Multiple ECAM Alerts

### 15.1. Effect on the Manuals

- FCOM
  - Update of the *Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / [RESET] System Reset / System Reset - General*.
- QRH
  - Update of the *Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / [RESET] System Reset / System Reset - General*.

### 15.2. Summary of the Modifications

Update of the guidelines for the system reset to take into account the case of multiple ECAM alerts.

In the case of multiple ECAM alerts, the flight crew should review each ECAM alert to determine the possibility of a reset of the associated system.

If there are several failures related to the same system, the reset is only authorized if it is authorized for all the failures that affect the system.

## 16. Precautions for Cockpit Seat Mechanical Adjustment

### 16.1. Effect on the Manual

- FCOM
  - Update of the *Aircraft Systems / Equipment / Flight Deck - Seats / Pilot Seat Mechanical Adjustment*.

### 16.2. Applicability

Applicable to specific pilot seat PNs included in the TFU 25.11.00.025.

Modifications applied to all the A320 Family aircraft, because it is not possible to determine the affected seat type.

### 16.3. Summary of the Modifications

Airbus received several reports of injuries related to the mechanical adjustment of the pilot seat.

In order to prevent additional injuries, Airbus now provides precautions as a warning to the flight crew when they use the mechanical adjustment of the pilot seat.